All things considered, the outlook is getting brighter

Here's a selection of charts that I'm paying special attention to these days. If there's a theme emerging from these snapshots of the economy and financial markets, it's a generally upbeat one, featuring continued low inflation, moderate and improving growth, and a gradual improvement in the fiscal outlook. 

Chart #1

Chart #1 shows the 6- and 12-month growth rate of private sector jobs—the ones that really count. From a long-term perspective, it looks like the economy is growing at an unusually slow pace—barely a crawl. But considering the massive deportations of illegals and the virtual closure of our borders, it's not surprising. Some will argue that this shows an economy hovering on the brink of "stall speed," but I think that's an analogy that doesn't really apply to an economy. Economies have a strong tendency to grow if they are not burdened by abrupt and unforeseen changes in monetary and fiscal policy. Meanwhile, it is comforting to see that new claims for unemployment show absolutely no sign of any fundamental deterioration in the outlook for business profits. Firings are low and stable. The worst that can be said about jobs is that there aren't many new jobs being created. But that could be improving.

Chart #2

Chart #2 shows the monthly change in private sector jobs, which appears to have picked up in the past month. It's too early to claim victory after just one month of improvement, but some of the following charts also show recent improvement.

Chart #3

Chart #3 shows the results of a monthly survey of purchasing managers. It has shown pretty lackluster levels for the past several years, followed by an exceptionally strong January report. This could be the first sign of a long-expected surge in the outlook for business manufacturing activity. Historically, readings below 47 have frequently coincided with recessionary conditions. Readings north of 50 almost always occur during periods of decent economic growth. If the recent report is not reversed, then we could be on the verge of a very welcome growth spurt.

Chart #4

Chart #4 shows the level of the federal government workforce. The past year has been dominated by an astonishing 11% decline in the federal workforce—the by-product of Trump's aggressive attack on the Deep State, in particular the Dept. of Education. As the chart also shows, the federal workforce today is as small as it has been since 1966! There are now 324K fewer regulators of the economy. A small government workforce equates to a significant reduction in regulatory burdens, which are typically a cost that most businesses would be happy to avoid. This frees up resources for productive activity, and this is an unalloyed Good Thing. NO ONE came close to predicting that the federal government workforce would ever decline by as much as it has in the past year.

Note that the spikes in the data that occur every 10 years correspond to the temporary hiring of people needed to conduct the Census. 

Chart #5

Chart #5 shows the year over year change in the Consumer Price Index, compared to a version of the CPI that excludes shelter costs (which make up about ⅓ of the CPI). The gap between the two that shows up in the past several years is the direct result of an over-estimation by the BLS of shelter costs. That problem is now behind us, and we are left with inflation that is only moderately above 2%. 

Chart #6

Chart #6 focuses on shelter costs (which are called Owner's Equivalent Rent). This is what you would be paying if you had to rent the house you live in, and it is something that the BLS manufactures inside its computers, since nowhere does there exist such a thing in the real world. Here we see that in the past month and past 3 months, the annualized change in this measure of shelter costs has fallen back—finally—to what it has tended to average in normal times. That explains why the gap between the two lines in Chart #5 has disappeared. 

Chart #7

Chart #7 has been featured regularly on this blog for the past several years. It is designed to show that the BLS's calculation of shelter costs (OER) is highly correlated to the year over year change in housing prices (blue line) from 18 months prior. It took longer for OER to fall (given the prior decline in housing price inflation) than I thought, but the two lines are now back in sync at a level that is consistent with 2% overall inflation. I note further that national home prices rose only 1.2% last year, and, adjusted for inflation, they are 2.2% below their mid-2022 peak. Housing prices are thus quite likely to exert downward pressure on inflation in the months to come. 

Chart #8

Chart #8 shows the year over year growth rate of the all-important M2 measure of the money supply. M2 rose on average by about 6% per year from 1995 through 2019, a period during which the CPI rose by 2% or less per year. More recently, M2 growth in the year ending January '26 was a mere 3.6%. In normal, pre-Covid times, most economists would predict that 3.6% M2 growth would lead to a slowdown in economic growth and a decline in inflation. Yet today the chatter is all about whether inflation is going to rise. This could be one of those times when the market is caught looking in the wrong direction.

Chart #9

Chart #9 shows what I consider to be a good measure of money demand: M2 divided by nominal GDP. This effectively measures how much of our annual income we like to hold in the form of readily-spendable money (currency, checking accounts, retail money market funds, etc). Money demand today is pretty much the same as it was prior to COVID. The Covid years were characterized initially by a gigantic increase in the demand for money, which was then followed by a return or "normal" levels. My interpretation of all this is that monetary conditions are just about right: money supply is matched by money demand, and that equates to the absence of monetary imbalances that might fuel higher inflation. 

Chart #10

Chart #10 compares the strength or weakness of the dollar (a rising blue line equates to a weaker dollar, while a declining blue line equates to a stronger dollar) with the inflation-adjusted level of a basket of basic commodity prices. Note the very strong correlation of these two variables over time—except for the period following the Covid crisis, when supply chains were disrupted but the consumers wanted to ramp up their spending. Commodity prices back then were much stronger than the strength of the dollar would have predicted, and they helped fuel rising inflation. Recently, however, the two variables have come back into line with each other. Commodity prices are no longer "too strong," while the dollar is still reasonably strong itself. Conclusion: commodity prices are not a source of inflation these days. Need I add that gasoline prices today are very close to their 20-year average ($2.88/gallon), and that they have fallen almost 40% from their 2022 high? Moreover, crude oil prices today are actually almost 10% lower than their 20-year average. 

Chart #11

Chart #11 shows the level of real GDP growth as it compares to two different trend lines (it's important to note the use of a log scale on the y-axis, which makes it easy to see growth trends). GDP rose by about 3.1% per year from 1966 through 2007, but since 2010 it has managed to grow by only a little more than 2.3% per year. Growth may be picking up of late, as noted in the comments above, but even if it does, the economy is still a lot less dynamic than it has been during most of our lifetimes. I think the "disappointing" growth of GDP since 2010 is due to several factors: 1) the $16 trillion the world spent on futile attempts to prevent global warming, 2) a huge increase in US transfer payments, and 3) a significant increase in regulatory burdens. All of which, I'm pleased to note, are in the process of reversing!

Chart #12

Chart #12 shows the level of federal government spending and revenues over the past 36 years. The difference between the two lines is, of course, the federal deficit, which is currently running at about $1.7 trillion per year. Note also the huge surge in federal spending triggered by the Covid crisis—that consisted of approximately $6 trillion in transfer payments which were effectively monetized by the Fed. It was all a nightmare, but it's fading rapidly. Note that spending has not reached new highs since 2022, and it has been flat for more than a year. The fiscal outlook is definitely improving.

Chart #13

Our national debt is just shy of 100% of GDP ($31 trillion), but we are not on the brink of a fiscal abyss. On the contrary, it is not unreasonable to think that Congress can manage some degree of spending control, and it is not the case that the economy faces a crushing burden of debt in any event, as Chart #13 shows. The true burden of debt is not the size of our national debt, but the cost of servicing that debt as a percent of our national income. Today that burden is significantly less than it was during the 1980s, mainly because interest rates are far lower than they were back then. If Congress exercises even modest restraint and the Fed doesn't have to raise interest rates (which they won't have to if inflation remains under control), then we can gradually reduce our deficits and the burden of our debt

All things considered, things don't look so bad at all!

UPDATE (2/27/26)

The Producer Price data for January '26 were released today. There are a lot of different versions of this data, (core, ex-energy, final demand, etc.) but I typically just focus on the aggregate index, which is shown in the chart below. From mid-2022, when inflation pressures generally peaked, the PPI is up at a 0.5% annualized rate through January '26. In other words, price pressures at the producer level have virtually ceased.

Chart #14

Slow M2 growth fuels stronger economic growth with low inflation

Yesterday's release of the December M2 money supply figures showed a continuation of the sub-6% growth trend that has been in place since inflation peaked in mid-2022. Despite over three years of very sluggish money growth, economic growth has exceeded most expectations. Why? Because money that was stockpiled during the Covid winter has been steadily released to fuel increased economic activity, while at the same time inflation has remained relatively low and federal deficits are shrinking.

The monetary and inflation fundamentals are pretty darn good these days, with the possible exception of the dollar, which has weakened on the margin in recent months. I am not worried about that, however, because the dollar remains substantially stronger than its long-term average in trade-weighted and inflation-adjusted terms. I'm not worried either about the surge in gold prices, which have recently surpassed $5,300/oz and appear to exist in an alternate universe. Abstracting from gold, commodity prices are well-behaved and show no sign whatsoever of inflationary behavior.

The following charts expand on these observations:

Chart #1

Chart #1 shows the level of the M2 money supply, plotted using a logarithmic y-axis to better illustrate how money grew at roughly a 6% annual rate from 1995 through 2019—a period during which inflation was well-behaved, averaging about 2% per year. M2 growth exploded beginning in 2020, as the federal government began "printing" some $6 trillion to fund massive transfer payments. The Fed finally woke up to this problem and began to hike interest rates in 2022, and money-printing ceased. Result: M2 is largely back to where it would have been had the Covid fiasco never happened.

Chart #2

Chart #2 is constructed to illustrate how inflation has tended to lag changes in money supply growth by about one year. The initial surge in money growth was not immediately inflationary because huge Covid-related uncertainty caused economic actors to stockpile money. In other words, Covid led to a huge increase in money demand—which meant that a huge increase in money supply was neutralized by a correspondingly huge increase in money demand. But after a year or so, money demand subsided and the money that had been stockpiled began to be spent, and that fueled rising inflation. Today we're essentially back to "normal," thanks to higher interest rates and saner fiscal policies. 

Chart #3

Chart #3 shows the 6-mo. annualized rate of change of the M2 money supply. Money growth has been very slow ever since inflation peaked in mid-2022, and although it has picked up in the past few years, it is still below the 6% trend that prevailed in the 1995-2019 period. The Fed made a huge inflationary mistake in the 2020-2022 period, but they now have the situation back under control. A flareup in inflation against a backdrop of 4-5% M2 growth, positive real interest rates (the 5-yr TIPS yield today is 1.3%), and declining federal deficits is therefore highly unlikely. Great news!

Chart #4

Chart #4 illustrates what I have called "money demand." It is the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP, and it can be thought of as a proxy for the amount of spendable money the average person or business wishes to hold relative to their annual income. Today money demand stands at just over 70%, having fallen from a peak of just over 90% in 2020. It is almost back to pre-Covid levels. Today there's no excess supply of money, and the demand for money has returned to levels that are much more normal. Result: low inflation for the foreseeable future. 

Chart #5

Chart #5 shows rolling 12-month totals for federal government spending and revenues. After exploding higher in 2020, federal spending has largely stabilized in recent years. Spending peaked at $7.62 trillion in March 2021, and last year spending totaled $7.05 trillion—that's almost five years of no spending growth! Over the same period, revenues surged from $3.52 trillion to now $5.38 trillion. As a result, the federal deficit has fallen from a high of $4.1 trillion in March 2021 to now only $1.7 trillion. That's still way too much, but it is almost certainly going to decline further. We're slowly getting back to normal. 

Chart #6

Over the past year, the dollar has fallen by roughly 10%. Normally that would be a cause for concern, especially since I believe that a strong currency is always better than a weak one. But as Chart #6 shows, when you adjust for inflation, the dollar is still trading about 15 to 18% above its long-term average. In a way, the dollar has gone from being very strong to just strong. I was relieved to hear Treasury Secretary Bessent today reiterate that a strong dollar is in our nation's best interest. 

Chart #7

Chart #7 shows the 75-year history of the S&P 500 index, which has grown by about 8% per year. It's a bit on the strong side of that trend, but nothing here looks particularly worrisome. Investors see a stronger economy, and they are voting with their feet. Makes sense.

Chart #8

Chart #9

Charts #8 and #9 are constructed in similar fashion. The blue line is the inverse of a popular dollar index (i.e., upward moves signify weakness, and downward moves strength in the dollar), while the red line in the first chart shows the inflation-adjusted price of gold, and in the second chart, the red line shows an inflation-adjusted index of a basket of 22 basic commodities. Note that in Chart #9, inflation-adjusted commodity prices have a strong tendency to move inversely to the changes in the dollar's value. (The nominal (non-inflation-adjusted) version of that same index has been flat for the past 4-5 years even as the dollar has weakened.) 

Gold and silver today are the only major commodity prices (with the notable exclusion of copper, which is facing heavy demand from AI-related industries) that are going up—and dramatically so. One important conclusion: gold and silver are fundamentally different from things like soybeans and sugar. Their rising prices do not necessarily imply a weaker dollar or higher inflation.

From this it follows that gold and silver should not be lumped together with other commodities. They just don't behave in the same manner. In any event, I wish I knew the cause and the implication for inflation of soaring gold prices, but I don't. It could just be rampant speculation, and/or heavy buying on the part of central banks trying to diversify their exposure to fiat currencies. In the latter case, I would be quick to add that central banks have a poor record when it comes to predicting inflation.

A return to relative tranquility

This is a short note to highlight the significant decline in market volatility over the course of the past year.

Price volatility is often thought of as "fear" that stems from uncertainty. The Vix Index, technically defined as the implied volatility of equity options, is the most common measure of volatility in the stock market, while the MOVE Index uses the implied volatility of Treasury bond options. The expected and implied volatility of prices underlying each index is a key determinant of the price of related options contracts. Higher expected volatility drives the price of options higher, and vice versa. Since purchasing options contracts reduces and investor's risk, options are highly prized (and thus more expensive) during periods of market distress. During periods of relative calm, investors are less likely to purchase options, and thus their prices decline. 

Chart #1

Chart #1 compares the Vix Index (white line) to the MOVE Index (orange line). Not surprisingly, both tend to move in tandem, but not always to the same degree. The last significant increase in volatility occurred last Spring, when Trump shocked the world with huge tariffs on U.S. imports. As the chart shows, volatility has subsided meaningfully since the Spring peak, and it now approaches levels which in the past have been associated with relatively calm (and often optimistic) equity and bond markets. 

The current relatively low level of both volatility indices is in many ways equivalent to a market-based measure of investors' confidence or sentiment. The market has lost its fear of tariffs, as many have been reduced or eliminated, and those remaining have failed to move the needle on inflation (as any economist worth his salt would have predicted) and do not appear to have posed much of an obstacle to growth (though I think the economy would be stronger without them). The principal value of Trump's tariffs derives from his ability to use them to achieve certain worthwhile objectives (e.g., reciprocal reductions in tariffs with some of our trading partners).

Improved confidence in the future is a good thing in and of itself, since it surely promotes greater saving and investment, which ultimately translate into more and better-paying jobs and higher living standards. On the other hand, finding good values in a period of tranquility becomes harder, and the market becomes more susceptible to disappointments. There's no free lunch, but things could certainly be a lot worse than they are today.