There's no need to worry about Trump's threatened tariffs causing another bout of inflation. Inflation is a monetary phenomenon that can only be caused by excess money, not artificially jacked-up prices. A sound monetary policy deals with rising prices for some things by forcing the prices of other things to decline. It's like living on a fixed budget—if you have to pay more for something that means you have to pay less for others.
This post reviews the monetary variables that matter most, and concludes that monetary policy is consistent with inflation remaining low and relatively stable; i.e., monetary policy today is sound. Indeed, we are more likely to see lower inflation than higher inflation this year.
M2 growth has normalized, and now is running at the same annual growth rate which prevailed from 1995 thru 2019 (~6% per year)—a time during which CPI inflation averaged 2.5% per year and PCE Core inflation averaged 2.0% per year (PCE Core is the inflation rate the Fed prefers to target). After surging in the wake of Covid stimulus spending and declining as the Fed raised interest rates, demand for money today is only modestly higher than it was in the pre-Covid period, Moreover, money demand appears to once again be stable. Meanwhile, the dollar remains very strong, credit spreads are low, real yields are high, the yield curve is steepening, lending is increasing at a modest pace, and liquidity conditions remain healthy. All consistent with relatively low and stable inflation.
M2 growth has normalized, and now is running at the same annual growth rate which prevailed from 1995 thru 2019 (~6% per year)—a time during which CPI inflation averaged 2.5% per year and PCE Core inflation averaged 2.0% per year (PCE Core is the inflation rate the Fed prefers to target). After surging in the wake of Covid stimulus spending and declining as the Fed raised interest rates, demand for money today is only modestly higher than it was in the pre-Covid period, Moreover, money demand appears to once again be stable. Meanwhile, the dollar remains very strong, credit spreads are low, real yields are high, the yield curve is steepening, lending is increasing at a modest pace, and liquidity conditions remain healthy. All consistent with relatively low and stable inflation.
The bad thing about Trump's threatened tariffs is that they could disrupt trade and slow global economies (including ours). If—as many of Trump's supporters suspect—tariffs are a bargaining chip and will prove only temporary at best, then markets may suffer a case of the jitters which should resolve over time.
Chart #1
Chart #1 shows the level of the M2 money supply, which is widely considered to be the best measure of the amount of spendable money in the economy. The US money supply increased at a roughly 6% annual pace from 1995 through the end of 2019. It then surged in unprecedented fashion as the government sent "stimulus" checks totaling some $6 trillion to households and businesses in an effort to counteract the contractionary impact of Covid -related shutdowns. As stimulus checks ceased in late 2021 and Fed interest rate hikes began to bite, M2 growth not only slowed by turned negative. M2 today stands at the level it first attained 3 years ago, and it is growing at about the same rate as pre-Covid.
Chart #2
Chart #2 shows the level of US currency in circulation, which makes up just over 10% of M2. Currency is the one monetary measure whose demand always equals its supply. Why? Because anyone who finds him or herself with more currency than desired can simply deposit it in a bank account, whereupon it is subsequently extinguished by the Fed.
What this chart tells us is that the demand for currency rose sharply as M2 surged, but then it declined, and now has returned to a level that is consistent with past experience. Today there is about the same amount of currency outstanding as there would have been if Covid had never happened.
Chart #3
Chart #3 is another measure of the demand for money: M2 divided by nominal GDP. By this measure, the demand for money has almost returned to where it was prior to the Covid era. This chart implies that the average person and average business holds about the same amount of spendable cash relative to income (nominal GDP is equivalent to national income) as they did prior to Covid.
The Great National Money-Printing Nightmare is over, and we sincerely hope it never returns.
Chart #4
Chart #4 shows the 6-mo. annualized rate of growth of the PCE and PCE Core measures of inflation, both of which are within spitting distance of the Fed's 2% target. The Big Inflation of the 2020s is over.
Chart #5
Chart #5 shows the level of the 3 major components of the PCE deflator. Non-durable goods prices are unchanged since mid-2022. Durable goods prices are unchanged since the end of 2021, and have resumed their decline. Only service sector prices are increasing, and those are largely driven by faulty calculations of housing inflation.
Chart #6
I've been showing Chart #6 ever since I can remember. That's because it shows that every recession in my lifetime has been preceded by a high level of real interest rates (blue line) and an inverted yield curve (red line). It was assumed to be an infallible indicator of a coming recession, but it didn't work over the past several years since the economy has continued to grow. The key difference this time is that the Fed has not caused a liquidity shortage like they did it past tightening episodes.
real rates push dollar up, comms down wtip5
higher interest rates have done the trick
Chart #7
Chart #7 compares the level of real yields on 5-yr TIPS (not to be confused with the real yields in Chart #6, which are overnight, ex-post real yields) with an index of the dollar's strength against other major currencies. Over the time period shown, changes in real yields have reliably matched changes in the dollar's strength. In order to tighten monetary policy, the Fed must take actions that strengthen the demand for dollars, and the best way to do that is to increase the real yields on investments denominated in dollars.
Chart #8
Chart #8 compares the strength of the dollar (blue line, same index as the one in Chart #7) with an index of non-energy commodity prices. (I exclude energy prices because they are orders of magnitude more volatile than other commodity prices.) Here we see a strong inverse correlation between the two, except over the past 4-5 years. Given the strength of the dollar, we would have expected to see much lower commodity prices. In my view, the current strength of the dollar is exercising a gravitational pull on commodity prices; over time this is likely to result in cheaper commodity prices.
Chart #9
Chart #9 shows the two most liquid indicators of corporate credit spreads. Spreads have rarely been lower than they are today, which is a strong vote of confidence in the health of the economy and the strength of corporate profits. No sign of an impending recession here. Instead, there is plenty of evidence that financial liquidity conditions are healthy and thus a recession is unlikely.
19 comments:
Thank you for the post, Scott. Very helpful, as usual.
"The bad thing about Trump's threatened tariffs is that they could disrupt trade and slow global economies (including ours)."
This would necessarily be a bad thing if one assumes that the global trade and global economies are somehow in a 'neutral state' and should be allowed to flow as it is.
It is not.
China, one of the largest economies in the world has the largest current account surplus. The USA, the largest economy in the world has the largest current account deficit.
Because of the USA massively open markets, China is able to abuse the USA markets and export its imbalances both directly and indirectly. American households are paying for this via higher debt or unemployment. The CCP is able to maintain its regime and false economic success thanks to this.
The "disruption" of global trade, would transfer wealth from those who benefit from this imbalance (e.g. certain American wall street institutions, CCP etc.) to American households. In addition, it would weaken an adversary and might force a rebalancing of their economy shedding light on the real state of their regime.
Looks like a win win to me. Trump is doing the right thing. Too many economies around the world are leeching off the American consumer while bashing the USA at the same time.
Scott,I truly love your blog and have been reading since 2010. Your quality is unmatched. I find you cut through all the noise and provide fact based data based trends and give your take on it based on your experience ass well. We are blessed that you share your knowledge and data with us.
Thank you
Scott, question from Chart 6' every recession in my lifetime has been preceded by a high level of real interest rates (blue line) and an inverted yield curve (red line). .. The key difference this time is that the Fed has not caused a liquidity shortage like they did it past tightening episodes.
What metric(s) are you looking at for liquidity shortage?
Thanks
It might not affect inflation if the central bank targets that, but then it would affect NGDP, which would affect RDGP in the short term. If however they target NGDP then it would result in inflation.
It's possible that higher RGDP caused by some potential positive policy could offset that, but that would be needed.
Hi Scott, do you think US small caps are compelling here? Thanks
Great charts and comments, Scott. Any thoughts about the massive deficit spending (6-7% of GDP for 2023 and 2024 and even larger in 2020-2022) as one of the reasons why we didn't see recession with the higher interest rates and real yields. If the government deficits were more typical (near 3%), would we have had a recession?
AI re metrics for liquidity shortage: I look at a variety of indicators to judge liquidity conditions: swap and credit spreads (lower being better), the VIX index (implied volatility—lower being better), bank reserves (more being better), and PE ratios (higher being better), plus occasional others.
apacino, re small caps: small cap stocks have dramatically underperformed large cap stocks over the past 10 years, delivering total returns that are roughly half those of large caps. I'm not alone in believing that Trump's policy proposals (lower tax and regulatory burdens) will provide especially fertile ground for small companies.
DanQ, re the benefits of large budget deficits: I have always believed that large budget deficits driven by excessive spending act as a headwind to economic growth, not a tailwind. Government spending is almost always less effective and less efficient than private sector spending. The deficits of the past several years undoubtedly benefited the recipients of government largesse, but the rest of us have paid a steep price in the form of wasteful spending, high regulatory and tax burdens, and a general squandering of scarce resources.
Roy, re the advantages of free trade: You argue that current account deficits are bad, but that ignores the fact that current account deficits are automatically offset by capital account surpluses. China doesn't "abuse" us by selling us more cheap goods and services than we sell to them. China's current account deficit is perforce completely offset by Chinese purchases of US assets (e.g., bank deposits, stocks, bonds, and real estate). In effect, China sells us cheap goods and then deposits the cash in US banks. We get cheap goods and we get to keep the money to boot.
Thanks Scott. I agree with you 100% about the wasteful spending, but I'm also thinking that some of the large deficit spending is stimulative in the short run before it becomes negative or devolves to a crowding out effect in the longer run. i.e A lot of the trillion dollars of extra deficit spending in FY 2024 is actual money going to business and individuals, who then spend it on other goods and services, and then gets recirculated. I know I sound like a Keynesian, but I imagine there is some impact in the short run. Long story short, I think there are a lot of solid fundamentals about the private sector of the economy, but the massive deficit spending is probably goosing it a bit.
Scott, I have a theory that the current high level of interest rates is actually inflationary, at least in the current cycle, because a lot of the inflation is related to shelter and OER. I also think high rates harm the faster creation of new housing supply because interest rates and mortgages/borrowing are so integral to housing. i.e. Builders own financing costs are more expensive and they are going to be conservative about how much new supply to add because most customers historically require financing to purchase a house. Maybe a piece by you on this and what the Trump administration may be thinking about this issue?
TY Scott!
DanQ, re interest rates and housing: As you note, high interest rates restrain the growth of housing supply. They also make currently-high housing prices unaffordable to the majority of households, thus reducing the demand for housing. So housing faces two difficult conditions: high prices and high interest rates. A solution for the housing problem thus requires lower prices and/or lower interest rates. I see limited scope for lower interest rates, but few if any impediments to lower housing prices.
re: "The key difference this time is that the Fed has not caused a liquidity shortage like they did it past tightening episodes"
Right, but how did they do it? They dropped legal reserves. The percentage of transaction deposits to savings/investment type accounts has doubled. Transaction accounts turn over at a much, much faster rate than time/savings deposits.
With inflation rising, see Cleveland FEDs nowcast
https://www.clevelandfed.org/indicators-and-data/inflation-nowcasting
versus more net private savings of households and institutions being absorbed by our fiscal deficits
https://www.clevelandfed.org/indicators-and-data/inflation-nowcasting
interest rates have nowhere to go but up:
10/1/2013 569.795 2462.787 680 3.622% of savings vs. deficits
10/1/2014 750.067 2847.983 485 5.872
10/1/2015 786.573 3162.291 442 7.155
10/1/2016 736.869 2984.788 585 5.102
10/1/2017 822.514 3366.586 665 5.063
10/1/2018 1137.964 3986.622 779 5.118
10/1/2019 1100.657 4712.634 984 4.789
10/1/2020 2088.186 10636.04 3132 3.396
10/1/2021 1157.692 8382.799 2772 3.024
10/1/2022 666.63 2264.383 1376 1.646
10/1/2023 942.225 3868.898 1684 2.297
Seems like the tradeoff to keeping liquidity abundant was a material pop in disruptive inflation (unlike well engineered low stable inflation that productively keeps business planning more clear and steady consumption). It's like somehow the FED wasn't involved in the post Covid monetary injection straight into circulation, someone figured out how to solve the "shovel ready" problem of fiscal policy deployment.
Another excellent post by Scott Grannis.
Yes, higher tariffs will cause only a one-time boost in prices, and then only if the exporting nation does not "eat" the tariffs. It depends on the elasticity of supply and demand.
China ate the last round of tariffs.
I am a supporter of tariffs, for a lot of reasons, especially if they can offset among the worst of taxes, the income taxes.
As I always say: Property, fuels and sales taxes, and tariffs, but no taxes on on income and on working.
Working and investing are positives and should not be taxed.
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