Monday, April 24, 2023

Good news: Argentina nears another devaluation


Argentina is approaching the point at which a devaluation of the peso (i.e., replacing the official exchange rate with a freely accessible market-based rate) is almost inevitable. Paradoxically, this will be good news for Argentina, at least for awhile. Ideally, Argentina should dollarize its economy, but that probably is too much to expect from a regime which is almost hopelessly corrupt.


The above chart traces the inexorable decline of Argentina's currency since 2007. Since its last iteration at the beginning of 1992, when it traded at 1 to 1 against the dollar, the peso has lost 99.8% of its value. In fact, the peso has been falling for more than a century. Back in 1916, the peso traded at 2 pesos per dollar. Since then, Argentina has changed its currency four times, each time lopping multiple 0's from its nominal value. If the original peso were still in circulation, it would be trading today at 4,580,000,000,000,000 to the dollar!

A new peso, or at the very least a new currency regime, in which the peso's value is determined by market forces instead of by government decree, is just around the corner. We know that because government officials are once again denying that there will be a devaluation. Anyone, like me, who has lived in Argentina long enough knows that official denials of an impending devaluation are a sure-fire signal that it is going to happen. We also know it because the current situation—inflation now exceeds 100%, the currency has lost over half of its value in just the past year, and interest rates exceed 80%—cannot go on forever. As a practical matter, since the largest denomination peso bill in circulation ($1000 pesos) is worth only $2.20 dollars, the average person must walk around with a huge roll of bills just to make incidental purchases. (A new $2000 peso bill has been authorized, but that won't fix the problem.)

The only unknown at this point is whether Argentina will continue to use pesos with a floating (i.e., market-based) exchange rate or whether it will dollarize its economy. The latter would be the best solution, but that's probably a bridge too far for the current bunch of corrupt politicians, since it would require a massive reduction in government spending. Throughout history, the Argentine government has financed deficit spending by resorting to the printing press. Printing money is a pernicious form of taxation, since anyone who holds onto currency that loses value on a daily basis is effectively paying a tax to the government in the form of lost purchasing power. Corrupt politicians have long known that printing money to pay for spending (which, in turn, helps buy votes) is much easier than cutting spending or raising taxes.

Lest we forget, our own government did precisely this in 2020 and 2021, when some $6 trillion of Covid "emergency" spending was effectively financed by a $6 trillion expansion of the M2 money supply. (I began explaining this way back in July '21.) That was the proximate cause of the inflation nightmare from which we are now waking up.

Paradoxically, a devaluation would likely be good news for Argentina, at least for awhile. That's because the current regime—which features an "official" rate of $220 pesos per dollar and a "blue" or parallel rate of $450 per dollar—discourages investment and tourism. If a tourist uses a credit card in Argentina, pesos get translated at the official rate instead of the market rate, which means things cost about twice as much as they would if the tourist used dollars exchanged at the "blue" or parallel rate. Similarly, most foreign exchange which passes through the banking system is processed at the official rate, and that amounts to a severe impediment to foreign investment.

A devaluation would be a boon to Argentine exporters since their export sales would be exchanged at 450 pesos rather than 220. Moreover, it would likely spark a huge inflow of foreign capital since investors would feel more comfortable knowing that they can get a market-based rate for their investment dollars—and it would be much easier to withdraw money in the future if they so chose. Plus, over the years Argentines have stashed hundreds of billions of dollars overseas, and at least part of that would be repatriated following a devaluation.

For more information on Argentina, I have written extensively on Argentina in this blog.

P.S. There are several alternatives that Argentina can choose from at this juncture: 1) eliminate all of the many official exchange rates (as much as a dozen in fact) in favor of a single, market-determined rate, 2) replace the peso with a “new” peso that has an exchange rate of, say, 4.5 to the dollar (thus lopping off two zeroes) while also unifying all exchange rates in one floating rate, and 3) dollarization, which would involve replacing pesos with dollars at an exchange rate of, say, 4.5 to the dollar. 

Door #3 would be the best, but also the hardest to implement, since Argentina would need the cooperation of the US Treasury and it would also need to permanently slash its bloated spending, because it would most likely be impossible to borrow all the money they are currently spending via the printing press. The reward to a successful dollarization would be the effective cessation of inflation, combined with a flood of new foreign investment and a surge in confidence—and ultimately a booming economy. Door #2 would be equivalent to what the government has done several times in the past, but it would require a cumbersome period during which old pesos could be exchanged for new pesos, and it would not force a reduction in spending or inflation. Door #1 is the easiest to implement, since it would require only a change in the laws governing currency transactions, but it would not require the government to curtail spending by enough to significantly reduce the current high level of inflation, which is ultimately the driving factor behind the plunging peso. Doors #2 and #3 would, however, provide some stimulus to the economy since they would likely lead to some new foreign exchange inflows and new investment. That’s because having one free-floating exchange rate is much more efficient than having several government-controlled rates.

P.S. (July 21, 2023): Since I wrote this list the Argentina Fund ETF (ARGT) is up over 20%. It's one of the strongest performers YTD, and over the past 5 years it has almost equaled the performance of the S&P 500. Who would have thought that the (arguably) worst country in the world, plagued by 100+% inflation and a disintegrating government, would deliver such amazing performance? My explanation: things were so bad in Argentina that they could hardly get worse, and now there is a glimmer of light at the end of a very dark tunnel. 

P.P.S. (August 14, 2023): Jorge Milei swept the presidential primary yesterday, surprising nearly everyone. He was my favorite, but most observers, including myself, thought he couldn't possibly win. I see this as great news for the long-term health of the country, but for the moment markets are taking it as bad news—thinking (correctly) that Milei would devalue the peso. Equities are down some 5% and the official exchange rate was devalued some 13% today. The "blue" rate is down 6% today. But here's the thing: Milei wants to ditch the peso, in order to replace it with something solid, like the dollar. That's what Argentina needs most of all. Assuming he is successful, investors should be anticipating huge upside potential for Argentine assets, not dumping them. But for now, uncertainty rules the day; the official election is still months away. Argentine assets are going for fire-sale prices now; they may get cheaper still, but Milei's victory is a sign that a revival is in the cards. Yesterday there was no hope for Argentina; today there is plenty.

P.P.P.S (October 9, 2023): It's still uncertain who will be Argentina's next president, but it is increasingly likely that it will be either Javier Milei or Patricia Bullrich. Both have good ideas that ought to brighten the long-term outlook. But the uncertainty—coupled with massive money-printing—has all but destroyed demand for the peso. The pressures are coming to a head, with elections just around the corner. Here's an update on the peso (official vs. blue); the blue rate is now intolerably weak vs. the official rate, while reserves are virtually exhausted—something big will happen soon:




Wednesday, April 12, 2023

Inflation is yesterday's news


Here's Bloomberg's take on today's March CPI release: "data showed inflation moderated last month, but not enough to forestall the Federal Reserve from raising rates at least one more time this year."

My take: There are only two things you need to know about inflation today: 1) without the Owners' Equivalent Rent component (which makes up about one-third of the CPI), the CPI would have declined at a -1.6% annualized rate in March, and 2) OER inflation has peaked and will almost surely decline significantly in coming months. In short, our national inflation nightmare is over. If the economists at the Fed can't understand this, they should be fired. There is absolutely no reason the Fed needs to raise rates further, and every reason they should begin cutting rates—beginning with the May 3rd FOMC meeting if not sooner. 

Chart #1

Chart #1 shows the 6-mo. annualized growth of the Consumer Price Index and the ex-energy version of the CPI. Both show that on the margin, inflation has declined significantly from its June '22 peak. Headline inflation is now running at about a 3.5-4% rate, not the 5% rate cited by most news sources today. 

Chart #2

Chart #2 shows the one- and three-month annualized rate of change of the Owners' Equivalent Rent component of the CPI. Here we see a dramatic slowing in this major source of CPI inflation that has only just begun. And as mentioned above, without the 6% annualized March increase in this component, the overall CPI would have actually declined. If OER continues to moderate, as it almost undoubtedly will, headline inflation will all but vanish in coming months.

Chart #3

Chart #3 shows how changing housing prices feed into the OER component of the CPI. It takes about 12-18 months for changes in housing prices to show up in OER. Nationwide housing prices peaked almost a year ago, and now OER inflation has peaked. This is a big deal. It's almost as if we have advance knowledge of what the CPI will be doing in coming months: CPI inflation will almost certainly decline, given the weakness in housing prices (which won't go away unless and until mortgage rates come down significantly).

Chart #4

Chart #4 shows another reason why the CPI is going down in a big way. Growth in the M2 money supply foreshadows changes in the CPI by about one year. Given the behavior of M2 in the past year, the CPI is on track to fall to 2% or less by the end of this year, if not sooner. 

To paraphrase Wayne Gretsky, the Fed should be focused on where CPI is going, not on where it has been. It's on its way to zero, and that means the Fed should cut rates—and the sooner the better.

UPDATE (April 13). Today's Producer Price Index news just reinforces the theme that inflation is on its way out:




These measures are different ways of looking at the early stages of the inflation pipeline. Very little to worry about!

Wednesday, April 5, 2023

The Fed needs to cut rates soon


Since the failure of Silicon Valley Bank almost a month ago, interest rates have fallen dramatically. 2-yr Treasury yields are down 130 bps, 5-yr Treasury yields are down 100 bps, and 10-yr Treasury yields are down 70 bps. This amounts to a pronounced steepening of the yield curve, and that in turn is the market's way of telling the Fed that they are going to have to cut short rates soon, and by a lot. In effect, the bond market has priced in a strong likelihood of significant monetary ease. The only question seems to be the timing: will it come at the May 3rd FOMC meeting, or will it be at the June 14th meeting? I wouldn't be at all surprised if it happened before May 3rd. If I were Fed Chair, I would announce a cut in the funds rate of at least 50 bps way before May 3rd. 

While it's very encouraging to note that swap and credit spreads are largely unchanged in the wake of the SVB failure (i.e., there are still no signs of an imminent recession, and liquidity in general remains abundant), there has been some significant capital flight out of smaller banks and into larger banks, and out of deposits and into money market funds and government securities. Since the end of February through March 22nd, commercial bank deposits have plunged by about $400 billion, according to the Fed. At this rate, it's reasonable to think that by now, deposits have plunged by at least another $200-300 billion, or almost $1 trillion since the end of last year. Depositors are voting with their feet, and they are almost running for the exits. Bank stocks have been hit hard, especially the regional banks. There's a strong whiff of crisis in the air.

As Chart #1 shows, the last time the bond market experienced something similar was in late 2007, just before the Great Recession. That's an uncomfortable parallel to say the least.

Chart #1

The top part of Chart #1 shows the Fed funds target rate (white line) and 2-yr Treasury yields (orange line), and the bottom portion shows the difference between the two. Leading up to the end of 2007, short-term interest rates had been rising as the Fed tightened, but then they began to fall precipitously. Notably, the Fed was very slow to follow suit, though eventually they did. By the end of 2008 the funds rate had fallen from 5.25% to 0.25% and financial panic had spread throughout the world. More recently, over the past year the Fed has been very slow to raise rates, always following the market instead of leading the market, since for way too long they thought that the big rise in inflation was just "transitory." Looking ahead, they will likely have to catch up to the reality of declining inflation and a slowing economy by lowering rates.

Unfortunately, the Fed is notorious for being behind the curve as rates rise, and behind the curve when rates fall. This serves to fuel inflation as it rises, and to crush the economy as rates fall. Today we apparently are watching another re-run of the same, unless the Fed soon wakes up.

For months I have been pointing to clear signs that monetary policy has become tight enough to make a difference in people's behavior. Higher rates increase the appeal of holding cash and bank deposits, and they discourage people from borrowing to buy, say, homes. The housing market has been hit hard: since early last year, applications for new mortgages have plunged by 50%, refinancing activity is down by more than 90%, and the supply of new homes for sale has more than doubled. Nationwide, home prices have fallen since hitting a peak about a year ago. Existing home sales are down 30%. 

The nascent banking crisis only serves to tighten monetary conditions, thus adding to already-existing downward pressure on inflation. Whenever a crisis starts, the public's demand for money (and safety) spikes. If that is not offset by a relaxation of monetary policy (i.e., lower interest rates), then deflationary pressures are the result. 

Chart #2

Chart #2 shows that the percentage of service sector businesses that report paying higher prices has plunged to its lowest level in almost three years. This is powerful evidence that inflation pressures in the all-important service sector peaked long ago (in December '21) and continue to decline. The inflation problem that the Fed is determined to fix is definitely on the mend; lowering rates today wouldn't stop this. Not cutting rates would only increase the downside risks to the economy. The time to ease is before the economy shows obvious signs of weakness, not after.

Quick update on mortgage rates:

Chart #3

Chart #3 shows the relationship between 30-yr fixed mortgage rates and the yield on 10-yr Treasuries. In normal circumstances, 30-yr fixed mortgage rates tend to be about a point and a half (150 bps) above the yield on 10-yr Treasuries. (Think of 10-yr Treasuries as the North Star of the world bond market: the standard against which all other interest rates trade.) If the current spread were 150 bps instead of today's 344 bps, 30-yr fixed mortgage rates would be 4.8% instead of today's 6.7%. Mortgage rates today are hugely inflated relative to where they should be, and that has a powerful and negative impact on the housing market.  They will trade lower only as the market loses its fear of inflation and its fear of an unexpected tightening of monetary policy.