Monday, April 5, 2021

Booming prices


The Fed continues to expand its balance sheet, the federal government continues to send out Covid relief checks, and the Fed continues to effectively monetize most if not all of this monetary "stimulus." Although this "stimulus" hasn't yet resulted in a significant rise in the general price level, we do see increasing—and potentially troubling—signs of booming prices in certain areas of the economy. I've been arguing for some time now that the Fed's profligate monetary expansion has not been inflationary because it has simply accommodated a similar, robust increase in the demand for money. But the demand for money of late is surely declining (while the supply is not) thanks to 1) rapidly spreading vaccinations and a significant increase in the US population's natural immunity, 2) increasing consumer confidence, 3) the ongoing relaxation of lockdowns and mask mandates, and 4) impressive signs of economic recovery.

In my view, we are already seeing early signs of what will eventually prove to be a meaningful increase in inflation, and this process is likely to play out over the next few years. Inflation seems sure to rise, but we do not yet know by how much.

Chart #1

As Chart #1 shows, the Fed has allowed the M2 money supply to increase at an unprecedented pace since February '20. M2 has surged by $4.2 trillion (27%) in the past 13 months, and has been rising at a roughly 15% annualized pace in recent months; that is far and above the 6.5% annualized rate of M2 growth in previous decades. The vast majority of the outsized increase in M2 can be found in bank savings and deposit accounts at the retail level. The public, in other words, has been hoarding money like never before, likely as a response to all the uncertainties raised by the Covid crisis. I calculate that M2 currently is about $2.3 trillion above its long-term growth trend. That's an extra 12% increase in the amount of money than would be held in "normal" times. If the public decides to reduce its cash holdings relative to income, this "extra" M2 could fuel a 12% increase in inflation over the next few years.

Chart #2

Chart #2 shows the Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index in both nominal and inflation-adjusted terms. Since February 2020, used cars have jumped 22% in price! In real terms, they are almost back to where they were during the boom times of the late 1990s. 

Chart #3

Used cars appear to be in very short supply (relative to demand), and new car sales these days are about as strong as they have ever been, as Chart #3 shows. No matter how you look at it, the demand for new and used cars is robust. Strong demand could be due at least in part to all those stimulus checks, coupled with very low borrowing costs and the public's pent-up demand to get out and about following a year of being shut in. 

Chart #4

Chart #5

Charts #4 and #5 show the prices paid component of the ISM manufacturing and service sector surveys. The vast majority of businesses are paying higher prices for stuff these days. That last time we saw such high levels—in the late 2000s—we also saw elevated levels of the CPI, which averaged 4% per year from mid-2005 to mid-2008. 

Chart #6

Chart #7

Housing has also been the beneficiary of unusually strong demand, as Chart #6 shows. In real terms the average home price in the US is now just about as high as it was at the peak of the 2006-2007 housing boom. Prices rose by about 11% last year and continue to move higher (it's not uncommon to see Zillow and Redfin reporting asking price increases these days, at least in local neighborhoods I follow). I expect to see this continue, fueled by exceptionally low mortgage rates and lots of cash in people's pockets. Plus, the Fed has vowed to not interfere with any of this until late next year. 

As Chart #7 shows, it takes about 18 months for big moves in housing prices (blue line) to show up in the housing component of the CPI (red line). As Milton Friedman taught us, the lag between monetary policy and inflation can be long and variable.

Chart #8

The elephant in the rising-price room is the US equity market. The S&P 500 is up over 20% since it's pre-Covid high in February '20. According to Bloomberg, the market value of all US equities has increased over that same period by about $10 trillion.

Chart #9

Non-energy commodity prices (red line, Chart #9) are up over 20% from their January '20 highs. A good portion of that rise can be attributed to a weakened dollar (blue line), but a weaker dollar is symptomatic of easy money and a precursor to inflation (as we saw in the 1970s). Note also that the dollar weakened in the 2005-2008 period and commodity prices also rose—and inflation increased meaningfully, as noted above.

Chart #10

The price of copper has jumped over 40% since the highs of January '20. This undoubtedly reflects booming construction activity around the world, but also can be attributed in part to easy money conditions in the US. 

Chart #11

Finally, as Chart #11 shows, one driver of higher prices is simply a decline in the market's level of uncertainty, as reflected in the declining Vix "fear" index. The uncertainty that prevailed throughout most of 2020 undoubtedly contributed to the public's hoarding of cash, and now this dynamic is unwinding. 

Unless and until the Fed reverses its Quantitative Easing efforts and/or raises short-term interest rates, declining fear, rising confidence, and strong economic growth are likely to fuel a palpable rise in inflation for the foreseeable future. 

Unfortunately, that in turn will give way—as has always been the case after periods of rising inflation—to tighter money, higher interest rates, and eventually (2023?) to sharply weaker economic growth.

Tuesday, March 23, 2021

The problem with unwanted money


The demand for money—as measured by the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP—currently stands very near to an all-time, eye-popping high (see Chart #1). The turmoil and fears which characterized the Covid-19 era caused the public to seek out and hold trillions of dollars of extra cash, and the Fed correctly obliged this demand for money and money equivalents by greatly expanding its balance sheet— transmogrifying notes and bonds into T-bill equivalents (aka bank reserves). (I've explained this all in detail over the course of many previous posts.) Conveniently, increased savings on the part of a terrified and sheltering public provided most—if not all—of the money that Treasury borrowed to fund Covid relief spending. 

Chart #1

Chart #2

But as Chart #1 suggests, the surge in money demand has passed. Confidence is returning and the economy is regaining lost ground. It stands to reason that the demand for money should begin to decline, and it has already declined, as we see in Chart #2, driven mainly by a sharp rise in nominal GDP. This is quite likely to continue; the main question going forward is how much of the increase in nominal GDP will be real and how much will be inflation. 

Chart #3

Chart #3 shows the daily volume of airline passengers (white) screened by TSA, with the magenta line being the 7-day moving average. Notice the sharp increase in air traffic in the past two months. Compared to the levels which prevailed 2 years ago at this time of year, air traffic is now down only 40%, whereas at the lows of last April, air traffic had plunged by an astounding 96%. With the rapid pace of vaccinations and increasing signs of optimism, there is every reason to expect air traffic to grow rapidly in coming months and the economy to grow as well.

The resurgent demand for air travel almost certainly is driven in large part by increased confidence. And with increased confidence, the rationale for the public continuing to hold a huge portion of their annual incomes in cash (i.e., the public's demand for money) surely is fading. But since the Fed has taken no steps to reverse its note and bond purchases, the M2 measure of money supply can't simply evaporate. And with the recently passed Covid relief bill, deficit-funding spending is going to ratchet up once again, which could add yet more money to the financial markets, especially since the Fed plans to continue to its purchases of notes and bonds. 

Unwanted money can't disappear, but it can fuel an expanding economy and it can bid up the prices of other assets.

Chart #4

Chart #4 provides some clues as to how this works. The bars represent the current yield on a variety of investments. The green line is the market's expected average annual increase in the CPI over the foreseeable future (about 2.3%); think of that as the average increase in the prices of all goods and services over the next 5-10 years. Owning cash, short-term Treasuries or mortgage backed securities is very likely to give you a loss in terms of purchasing power. On the other hand, yields on real estate trusts, high-yield debt, emerging market debt and the S&P 500 promise to deliver a purchasing power gain. Unwanted money (much of which is held in very short-term investments such as T-bills, bank deposits and 2-yr Treasury notes) will naturally want to seek out the much more attractive returns on just about all other assets. And as prices for other assets rise, their yields will decline. 

This is another way of saying that a tsunami of unwanted cash likely is going to lift the prices of just about everything, and that is another way of saying we are going to see more inflation in the years to come, UNLESS the Fed reverses course. Which they have promised not to do for at least another year and a half. 

Chart #5

Chart #5 shows us the bond market's way of expressing the view that inflation is likely to average about 2.3% per year for the foreseeable future. The difference between real and nominal Treasury yields gives you the market's expected rate of inflation. Note that most of the increase in inflation expectations of late has come from a rise in nominal Treasury yields. Real yields are still very low.

Chart #6

Chart #6 shows how 2-yr real yields on TIPS have a strong tendency to track the growth rate of real GDP over time. That real yields are currently so low means that the market either does not have a lot of confidence in future growth prospects, and/or the market is still very risk averse (meaning that people are willing to pay extremely high prices for the relative safety of TIPS). Going forward, we are likely to see real yields rise as long as the economy demonstrates that it has the ability to grow by at least 1-2% per year for the next several years. 

Chart #7

Chart #7 gives us a long-term view of the evolution of the Treasury yield curve (using 2- and 10-yr yields as the classic reference points for short and long-term interest rates). Bear in mind that short-term rates are heavily influenced by both the Fed's monetary policy target and the market's demand for safe assets. The yield curve has steepened noticeably since last summer, mainly due to rising long-term yields, which in turn have been driven by expectations that the economy will improve enough to allow the Fed to raise short-term rates in the future. This is a healthy development, since very low yields are a sign of a very weak and risk averse economy. There's no reason yet to worry that higher yields will derail the ongoing equity market rally. 

Tuesday, March 16, 2021

The Covid winter is over

Here are just a few important and very encouraging charts—part of a larger picture in which the US  economy is definitely emerging from its long Covid winter.

Chart #1
Chart #1 shows a critical and timely measure of US air travel, which includes data as of yesterday. The green line is the 7-day moving average, which is the one to watch since there are definite trends in travel on the various days of the week. Here we see that passenger traffic has increased 78% (!!) since January 27th of this year. It's still down over 40% compared to the levels which prevailed before the onset of lockdowns, but the recovery is proceeding rapidly. Looking ahead, we still have a lot of good news to look forward to as confidence is on the rise and vaccinations proceed apace. And by the way, the US stands out as leader of the vaccination pack among developed nations, with the notable exception of Israel, which has vaccinated over half of its population.

Chart #2

My state has been one of the hardest hit (mostly due to extreme lockdown measures ordered by our politicians). As Chart #2 shows, big lockdowns didn't flatten the curve at all last year, since they were firmly in place last November, when daily new cases began to surge. Vaccines have helped, but they can't really account for the bulk of the decline year to date, since it was underway well before significant numbers were vaccinated. That means natural immunity (acquired from exposure to the illness or natural exposure to similar viruses over the years must be a very important factor contributing to the rapid demise of this pathogen. Either way, the severity of Covid cases and the growth of new daily cases has improved dramatically. In Los Angeles County (10,000,000) population, there were only a handful of Covid-related deaths in the most recent reported week, and daily new cases have dropped almost 90% since late January. Overall, statewide daily new cases have plunged 92% since late January.

Governor Newsom: please open the California economy NOW!

Chart #3

Chart #3 is one of my perennial favorites, since it shows the Fed has been responsible for almost every recession in the past 60+ years (the notable exception being the brief Covid crackdown recession that started a year ago). Recessions (gray bars) have occurred after every major spike in the real Fed funds rate (blue line) and every major flattening or inversion of the yield curve (red line). The purpose of Fed tightening has always been to increase real interest rates (and effective borrowing costs) in order to break the back of rising inflation. (Higher real interest rates work to increase the demand for money thus reducing the amount of excess money in the system at the same time the Fed is withdrawing reserves and shrinking the supply of money.) A significant tightening of monetary policy also causes the yield curve to flatten and to eventually invert (when long-term rates fall below the level of short-term rates). An inverted yield curve almost always means that monetary policy is so tight the economy begins to suffer and the market realizes that the Fed will soon have to reverse course.

As should also be apparent, we are nowhere near either of those conditions at present. Real interest rates are exceptionally low, and the Fed has promised to keep them there for a looonnnggg time. (I have serious doubts they will actually do that however). The yield curve has steepened a bit, which is a sign that the bond market realizes that the economy is improving and the Fed will eventually have to raise short-term rates at some time in the future. But it is not very steep from an historical perspective. 

Other indicators that have traditionally signaled that monetary policy is so tight that it is threatening economic growth prospects—such as 2-yr swap spreads and Credit Default Swap spreads—are firmly at the low end of their historical ranges. That means that liquidity is abundant and the outlook for corporate profits is positive. In short, there are no warning signs of economic trouble ahead to be found in the market. 

I would ordinarily be ecstatic about the prospects for the economy, were it not for a growing number of disturbing developments such as huge increases in government spending, promises of huge increases in a broad range of taxes, growing federal control over the economy, continued lockdowns and mask mandates, and expanded welfare measures (e.g., higher minimum wages and increased healthcare subsidies). Most troubling is the prospect of a significant increase in inflation, since that inevitably erodes standards of living, raises barriers to savings and investment, and works to transfer the burden of a mountain of government debt to the private sector in devious and pernicious ways.

All the things that worry me share a common denominator: they serve to reduce the incentives to work and invest. In short, they are anti-supply side. As a supply-sider, I firmly believe that the only way to truly stimulate an economy is to increase the incentives to work and invest by reducing tax burdens, keeping the value of the currency stable, and minimizing the amount of government intrusion in the economy.