Friday, September 6, 2019

Jobs growth continues to slow, but it's not a problem

For the past several months, I've observed that the growth rate of private sector jobs was slowing. Today's jobs report—which was much weaker than expected (96K vs 150K private sector jobs) only confirmed that. It's not a cause for concern or a precursor of a recession, however. Most likely it just reflects the fact that it's getting harder for employers to find new workers.

Chart #1

Chart #1 tracks the monthly change in private sector jobs. It's pretty clear from this that jobs growth has been decelerating since last January. It's also true that jobs growth has decelerated prior to the last two recession. This time, however, things look very different. Unlike the runup to prior recessions, to date the Fed has not restricted liquidity; real interest rates are very low; credit spreads are very low; and systemic risk is very low. The only other sign of a recession is the inverted yield curve, but as I explained in a prior post, today's inverted yield is a sign of risk aversion, not a sign of an economy struggling under the burden of tight money.

Chart #2 

Chart #2 shows the 6- and 12-month rate of change in private sector jobs. I think this is the only reliable way of judging whether jobs growth is accelerating or not. Monthly numbers are way to volatile—and subject to huge revisions—to come to meaningful conclusions. What we see now is that jobs are growing at something like a 1.3-1.6% annual rate. That's down quite a bit from the 2.0% rate which prevailed around the end of last year. But it doesn't condemn the economy to a recession or even to an uncomfortably slow rate of growth. For the first six months of this year, labor productivity surged to an almost 3% annual rate. Slower growth in jobs has been accompanied by faster growth in the average worker's value added. There's nothing wrong with that, especially since productivity has been rising for the past several years after having been dismally weak for most of the current expansion.

Over the past year, productivity rose by almost 2%. Thus, a relatively weak 1.6% growth in jobs in the past year generated real GDP growth of 2.3%. If productivity continues to pick up (thanks in no small part to Trump's deregulation efforts), then a measly 1.3% growth in jobs could deliver 3% real growth or more.

Chart #3

Chart #3 tracks first-time claims for unemployment, which typically begin to rise in advance of recessions as businesses sense a deterioration in their business outlook and attempt to shed workers and cut back on expenses. That's certainly not the case today! The worst that can be said about claims is that they have been flat for the past 12 months, averaging 217K per week.

Chart #4

Chart #4 divides unemployment claims by total payrolls. By this measure, unemployment claims are much lower than they have ever been before. This is a virtual "jobs nirvana" since it means that the chance of the average worker being fired is lower than ever before. And on top of that, wage growth has been accelerating: average hourly earnings rose 3.2% in the past year, and that's up significantly from the 2.0% pace that prevailed in 2014 and the 2.6% pace of 2016.

Chart #5

Chart #5 compares job openings with the number of persons unemployed but looking for work. There are more jobs available than people looking for jobs, and that's been the cast for over a year.

Slow jobs growth these days is not a sign of a deteriorating economy, it's a sign of a healthy labor market that continues to seek out new hires, only to find it difficult due to a shortage of people willing to work.

Tuesday, September 3, 2019

Tariffs are really beginning to hurt trade and manufacturing

It should not be surprising to learn that Trump's tariff war with China is having a negative impact on the US economy and global trade. Tariffs inhibit trade, and most of the tariff hikes to date have been directed at manufactured goods. The latest data show just how much this impact has been, and it is not insignificant.

Chart #1

Today's release of the August ISM manufacturing survey data showed a big drop in export orders (see Chart #1). The August reading of 43.3 was the second lowest in history of this data series, worse than the late 1998 reading, which was negatively impacted by the S.E. Asian currency devaluations in early 1998 and the Russia/LTCM implosion in late 1998. Only the Great Recession generated a weaker number, and that, in turn, reflected the worst collapse in global trade since the Depression. (As an aside, the collapse of trade that occurred in late 2008 was largely a function of the inability of exporters to get letters of credit from a global banking system that was in complete disarray.)
Chart #2

The overall ISM manufacturing survey began to weaken in late 2018, and by now, a slump in activity in the manufacturing sector has put considerable downward pressure on US GDP, as Chart #2 suggests. Though it's not likely enough to tip the economy into a recession, it is nevertheless of concern. The bond market has not been blind to this, however, as suggested by the significant decline in real yields since late last year. By my estimates, 0% real yields on TIPS most likely are priced to a slowdown in GDP growth to 2% or possibly less for the foreseeable future.

Chart #3

As Chart #3 shows, the volume of world trade has been declining since its Oct. '18 peak. (The latest datapoint is for June '19; undoubtedly the index has weakened more since then.)

Chart #4

Chart #4 reflects Chinese trade statistics through July of this year. China's exports to the US have not been greatly harmed by the imposition of tariffs, most likely because the yuan has fallen almost 13% since Trump first began slapping tariffs on Chinese imports. Chinese manufacturers effectively have absorbed the brunt of the US tariff costs by accepting a lower dollar price for their goods while receiving more yuan per dollar of sales. The decline in Chinese imports from the US can be attributed not only to China's imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods, but also to the fact that the weakness of the yuan has boosted the yuan cost of US imports by over 14%. 

Chinese imports from the US have suffered significantly of late. According to Chinese statistics, July'19 imports were 19% below the level of a year earlier. US statistics confirm this, showing that June '19 exports to China were down 17% from a year earlier.

Chart #5 

Tariff-related trade tensions have plagued the markets for most of the past month. 10-yr Treasury yields have fallen below 1.5%, driven by risk aversion (Treasuries are classic hedges against a weakening economy and they are the ultimate safe-haven asset) and declining growth expectations. Meanwhile, the Vix index has risen as fear and uncertainty drives demand for the risk-reducing properties of options in lieu of outright positions. 

UPDATE (9/5/19): The manufacturing sector is definitely hurting these days, but the much larger service sector—which accounts for over 70% of total private sector payroll employment—is doing just fine.


Chart #6 

Service sector business activity rebounded strongly in August (Chart #6). July's plunge was most likely a reflection of worried sentiment (this is all based on surveys of people's opinions) rather than an actual deterioration in business activity.

Chart #7 

The employment index (hiring intentions) softened a bit in August, but remains at a healthy level (Chart #7).

Chart #8

The Eurozone service sector survey reveals a continuing improvement, albeit modest, from the depressed levels of late last year. (Chart #8)

Chart #9

The service sector New Orders index rebounded in August from depressed July levels. Like Chart #6, this likely reflects improving sentiment (less worried sentiment) rather than any fundamental change in new order activity.

The service sector remains healthy, and that is a nice offset to obvious weakness in the manufacturing sector. The economy as a whole is thus likely to continue growing, albeit at a less-than-impressive pace (~2%). 

Sunday, September 1, 2019

Another look at corporate profits

A few days ago, the second revision to Q2 GDP gave us our first look at corporate profits for the quarter. My preferred measure of profits is after-tax, with adjustments for inventory valuation and capital consumption allowances, as calculated in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). As Art Laffer is fond of saying, this represents "true economic profits,” and it is a consistent measure that goes back a long time. On that basis, second quarter profits rose 5.1% from first quarter profits, but for the year ended June '19, profits were up only a modest 2.7%. Over the past 5 years, profits have grown at an annualized pace of just 1.9%. Not very impressive, right? Well, not exactly. Here's some context which puts profits in a more attractive light:

Chart #1

Chart #1 shows 60 years of corporate profits compared to nominal GDP. Note that the y-axes are both plotted using a semi-log scale, and both are scaled identically (i.e., the top value is 150 times the bottom value). Lines plotted thusly have an identical slope if their growth rates are also identical. What stands out here is that corporate profits have handily outpaced nominal GDP growth since 2001.

Chart #2

Chart #2 uses the same data as #1, dividing profits by GDP. From 1959 through 2001, profits averaged a about 6.1% of GDP, and they were mean-reverting around that value. Since 2001, however, they have averaged 8.7%, with no signs of a mean reversion to 6%. In short, corporations these days are generating profits on a scale never seen before 2001: for the past 17 years corporate profits have averaged a higher percentage (about 40% higher) of GDP than they ever saw in prior years. That translates into a roughly 40% increase in profits when measured against GDP .

Chart #3

I theorized over 6 years ago that, due to globalization, US corporations' ability to boost sales and profits had increased significantly, and this explained why we shouldn't expect to see a reversion to the old profits/GDP mean. In a rapidly-globalizing world, expanding foreign markets allowed US corporations to significantly and permanently expand their sales. As Chart #3 shows, corporate profits have averaged about 2% of World GDP since 1960, with some signs of mean reversion around that mean. In other words, while corporate profits are running strong relative to our economy, they are simply keeping pace with the much-faster growth of the world economy.

Chart #4

When profits surged to over 10% of GDP in the early years of the current expansion, most observers expected them to revert again, which is why PE ratios were depressed despite spectacular growth in profits (see Chart #4 and this post for more details). Today PE ratios are about 15% above their long-term average, but then again, profits continue to be a much larger percentage of GDP than they have been over the long term. I don't see any cause for concern over current PE ratios.

Chart #5

A few years ago, in a post entitled "A better PE ratio," I discussed an alternative way to measure PE ratios using the S&P 500 index (a good proxy for total market capitalization) and dividing it by NIPA profits (arguably the best measure of total corporate profits). I've done that in Chart #5. Note that the ratio is normalized so that its long-term average is equal to the long-term average of the standard measure of PE ratios (just under 17), which divides stock prices by trailing 12-mo. earnings per share (EPS). Both PE ratios today are running about 15% above average.

Chart #6

Chart #6 shows both measures of profits, again by using two y-axes with similar ratios and a semi-log scale. Note that the "gap" between NIPA profits and EPS profits has closed rather dramatically in recent years. Much of that came about thanks to a downward revision to past years' NIPA profits announced earlier this year. In any event, both measures of profits seem now to be tracking each other more closely, and both give rise to similar PE ratios. Neither measure suggests that equity valuations are excessive. PE ratios are above their long-term average, but profits are in general much more abundant, relative to GDP, than they have been over the long haul. What's not to like about this?