Thursday, August 27, 2026

A Goldilocks economy?


When I review recent news and ponder the meaning of the charts below, these are the thoughts that come to mind:

The M2 money supply is well-behaved—the excesses of the Covid era have been absorbed—and it is once again growing at a rate that in the past has been consistent with relatively low inflation. Interest rates at current levels (5-yr Treasury yield ~4.5%, 10-yr ~4.7%) seem about right given a relatively slow-growing economy and inflation of 2-3%. Corporate profits are on the moon—literally off the charts. Stocks are fairly valued, maybe a bit rich, given the current level of interest rates. Unemployment is low and falling. Jobs growth is slow (1.5-2%) but increasing. The Fed is not making any big mistakes. Woke energy policies are fading fast, even in Europe, and AI is spreading like wildfire. Global economies are thus likely to enjoy a tailwind for the foreseeable future. Is this a Goldilocks economy, or what?

Chart #1

Chart #1 compares the level of 5-yr Treasury yields to the ex-energy rate of inflation. (Energy is by far the largest contributor to the ups and downs of inflation, and the war in Iran has only made matters worse.) Interest rates at current levels have kept inflation in check in the past, and now seem likely to exert a bit of down pressure on inflation going forward. Regardless, I continue to believe that the inflation statistics overweight and over-measure shelter costs, and that problem is slowly receding.  

Chart #2

Chart #2 shows the level of the M2 money supply plotted on a logarithmic scale to highlight its fairly constant growth rate over time. M2 grew by about 6% a year from 1995 through 2007, and during that time inflation was relatively low and stable. Today, M2 is only slightly above its long-term trend. 

Chart #3

Very few analysts track the relationship of M2 to nominal GDP. I think it is a good measure of the demand for money, and that is key to being able to understand whether the Fed is doing its job with the money supply. (Inflation happens when the supply of money exceeds the demand for it.) Money demand is back to where it was prior to the Covid era. Coupled with the 6% growth rate of the M2 money supply, this leads me to the conclusion that monetary policy likely is in a sweet spot for now. (Long-time readers will know I have been saying this for the past several years.)

Chart #4

Chart #4 shows the ratio of economy-wide corporate profits (a key component of the GDP accounts) to nominal GDP. Think of this as a proxy for corporate profit margins. Corporate profits are at historically high levels, and more than twice what they were in the 1970s and 1980s, as the dashed green lines show. No economist in his right mind would ever have predicted this, and I certainly didn't. With corporate profits at record levels and growing, is it any wonder that the stock market is making new highs?

Chart #5

Chart #5 shows the level of the S&P 500 index plotted on a logarithmic scale. The green line is a stand-in for the long-term growth trend of this index (~8% per year). Pay particular attention to the 2008-2009 recession, and how this resulted in a severely depressed stock market. Now note that the S&P 500 has come back to its long-term growth trend; this is why stocks have had such a strong run over the past 17 years.

Chart #6

The red line in Chart #6 compares the actual market capitalization of the U.S. stock market using the S&P 500 index as a proxy, while the blue line is the result of capitalizing the measure of corporate profits that I have used in preceding charts. To capitalize profits I divide corporate profits by the 10-yr Treasury yield)*. Note that the market cap was significantly lower than capitalized profits from 2009 through 2024; this corresponds to an underperformance relative to trend from 2009 through 2024 that shows up in Chart #5. It is certainly likely that the undervaluation of stocks during that period was exaggerated by the fact that the Fed was mistakenly keeping interest rates historically low for a number of years.

None of this is science, to be sure, but from two different perspectives it seems that as of a few years ago, stocks have returned to prior trends and are now more or less fairly valued. This could of course change if the Fed were to significantly raise interest rates, since that would reduce capitalized profits and in turn depress stock prices.

* Reasonable people could argue about which yield to use when capitalizing profits, but I think the 10-yr Treasury yield is as good as any. I credit Art Laffer with bringing this method of equity valuation to my attention many years ago: he used it in early 2000 to correctly argue that stocks were overvalued and due for a fall.

UPDATE: (Aug 28 '26): 

Chart #7

Chart #7 is Bloomberg's Financial Conditions Index, which tracks just about everything you would want to know about financial conditions. The latest reading is just shy of a multi-year high, which is exactly what you might expect to see in a Goldilocks economy. 

10 comments:

Salmo Trutta said...

Real GDP 1.5% for Q2.

But Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (A191RI1Q225SBEA) @Q2 2026: 6.4%

Gross Domestic Product (A191RP1Q027SBEA) @Q2 2026 8%

That looks like stagflation, business stagnation accompanied by inflation.

The ratio of demand deposits to time deposits is still rising, bolstering GDP.

The bond proxy, the 24 month moving average of the 24 month rate-of-change in monetary flows, the volume and velocity of money, won’t peak until early 2028. I.e. the interest expense on the Federal Debt will keep increasing.

Salmo Trutta said...

The FED needs to tighten reserves while the FDIC needs to cut deposit insurance (as banks don't lend deposits).

Rohan Marley said...

Your using the risk free rate to capitalize profits? Where's the risk premium???

R Paul Drake said...

This all reminds me of how things felt in 2006. There was no sign then in the macroeconomic parameters of the risks associated with housing and related financial structures. Today the risk of overinvestment in AI infrastructure and the related financial structures.

Ataraxia said...

I like chart #6, I don't remember you publishing this before.

Scott Grannis said...

Re: "This all reminds me of how things felt in 2006. There was no sign then in the macroeconomic parameters of the risks associated with housing and related financial structures." That's true, but back then we knew Congress was pushing banks to increase mortgage lending to extremes; recall: interest only loans, stated income loans, zero down loans, etc. Housing prices had more than doubled in the previous 10 years. Cash-out refinances were booming. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were buying up mortgages as fast as Countrywide could make them. Walls Street was buying up mortgages turning them into exotic derivatives. I'm on record at my prior firm as warning about the risks of a huge decline in housing prices.

Fred said...

There is evidence that banks and private equity are financing the data center construction with similar exotic derivatives all backed by Nvidia stock. Same theory: the stock will always go up because AI is transformational. However, if turns out to be less so, and the stock craters, we could be in a similar situation as we were in during the financial crisis. You know those investments are backed up by CDSs. Will a socialist leaning Congress or President bail out the banks next time?

Salmo Trutta said...

Reserves are balances used to settle payments, meet liquidity requirements (Level 1 HQLA), and transmit monetary policy (via IORB and the fed funds corridor).

Warsh is still operating with an ample-reserve’s regime. Reserves aren’t binding. Reserves aren’t scarce. Reserves are above the lowest comfortable level of reserves (LCLoR):

“The lowest dollar level of reserves a bank would feel comfortable holding before taking actions to maintain or increase its reserve balances.”

Reserves serve as a buffer in the Treasury’s debt-management auctions. Temporary support measures may be necessary to maintain “orderly” conditions in the government-securities market.

Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks on the H.4.1 release have fallen by 301,044b since July 3, 2025. Inflation has increased in the interim. But that is not a harbinger of future inflation rates.

The shift from time deposits to demand deposits may not be over however a large proportion of those demand deposits have low turnover rates. And the 10-month rate-of-change in monetary flows, the volume and velocity of means-of-payment money, the PROXY for R-gDp, is falling rapidly.

Variant said...

Definitely not a goldilocks economy, but potential for one if not for all the protectionism. Hopefully, Trump drops the tariffs. The courts are too slow to act.

Salmo Trutta said...

The correct response to stagflation is the 1966 Interest Rate Adjustment Act. “while the aggregate of time and demand deposits continued to increase after July, the proportion of time to demand deposits diminished. Whereas time deposits were 105 percent of demand deposits in July, by the end of the year, the proportion had fallen to 98 percent. These were all desirable developments.”

It is with the April through October period that we are most concerned. During this period the Federal Reserve forced an actual reduction in member bank legal reserves, down about $1 billion from a level of approximately $24 billion.

The Reserve authorities allowed bank credit to expand during 1966 by $19.7 billion, or at an annual rate of approximately 6 per cent. This compares to an annually compounded rate of increase of approximately 7 per cent in the preceding ten years, and a rate of about 5 percent for the entire period since World War II.

M1 peaked @137.2 on 1/1/1966 and didn’t exceed that # until 9/1/1967. Deposit rates of banks decreased from a high range of 5 1/2 to a low range of 4 % (albeit not enough). A .75% interest rate differential was given to the nonbanks.

And during this period, the unemployment rate and inflation rates fell and real interest rates rose for saver-holders.